KIEV’S SABOTAGE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AGAINST DONBASS
ESSENCE, TASK, AND PURPOSE
Information and psychological operations (InfoPsyOps) of the special services of Ukraine are carried out amid civil war conducted by Kiev against the unrecognized people's republics – the DPR and LPR. To hide this shameful phenomenon from the world public, the Ukrainian authorities camouflage the concept of civil war, calling it either an antiterrorist operation or an operation of the United forces. Due to this layer of mimicry, not only the conduct of hostilities is given a formal legitimate status, but also the technology of “fights without rules” against their own citizens is legalized as well. At the same time Kiev calls them “terrorists”, “separatists”, “koloradas” (those who wear and respect a St.George's Ribbon), “vatniki” (radical pro-Russia patriots), etc.
In particular, during the military operation against the republics of Donbass, under the leadership of Western curators, there was a crossing (hybridization) of such relatively independent forms of confrontation as sabotage and InfoPsyOps.
According to our assessment, these actions are better defined as sabotage and psychological operations (SPO). They are based on misinformation and lies, provocations, intimidation and manipulation of public opinion. Essentially, it's "Goebbels" propaganda.
At first, InfoPsyOps have been conducted by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Chief Directorate of Intelligence of the ministry of Defense of Ukraine, and the Ministry of Information Policy. The Foreign Intelligence Service and Administration of State Border Guard Service also played role in the issue. The National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) coordinated these actions. Later on, after the creation of the Special Operations Forces (SOF), the InfoPsyOps units of the Armed Forces were subordinated to them and started to conduct the SPO as well.
The two main bodies that are conducting InfoPsyOps against the republics of Donbass, SBU and SOF, are worth of paying attention.
In SBU there are 3 departments that are responsible for carrying out such operations: Department of Counterintelligence Defense of State Interests on Information Security (DCIS of SBU), Department of Protection of National Statehood (DPNS of SBU) and National Academy of SBU, which has a special department training InfoPsyOps specialists. These specialists are included in groups of Special Information Operations (SIO) being a part of the Joint Staff of the Central Department of SBU in cpunterterrorist operation zone (JS CD SBU). The body which was responsible for SBU activities in Donbass since January, 2015. It was established by the order No. 7t of 14.01.2014 signed by the Chairman of Security Service of Ukraine Valentyn Nalyvaichenko.
Structure of JS CD SBU operating in Donbass (Page 1)
Structure of JS CD SBU operating in Donbass special information operations section (Page 10)
The group’s personnel includes mostly members of DCIS, DPNS and National Academy of the Security Service of Ukraine. Here the roster of personnel of JS CD SBU in Donbass operations in 2017.
Personnel of JS CD SBU as of July, 2017
SABOTAGE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OF SERCURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
It is from this time that the actual sabotage and psychological operations begin to crystallize. And this is understandable. Having failed to defeat the republics of Donbass by military means, the Kiev authorities began to emphasize the hybridization of sabotage and psychological operations, documenting these types of active actions in a single whole. This is confirmed by a document of interest which I’ve obtained. It has a “Top secret” stamp – the Decision of the Joint Intelligence Committee under the President of Ukraine as of April 21, 2015. This is a kind of closed from the public regulatory and legal framework for the conduct of SPO.
Let me remind that it was only two months since heavy fights near Debaltseve, on Bakhmutskaya highway, and in the Airport of Donetsk were over, and the plan of the Ukrainian government to return “rebellious provinces” under control failed. The new country leaders who came to power as a result of coup d’etat decided to begin sabotage war combined with InfoPsyOps against the republics of Donbass and in Crimea.
Decision of the Joint Intelligence Committee under the President of Ukraine as of April 21, 2015 (Page 1)
Pay attention to point 2 of this Decision:
“Speed up the creation of secret service and fighting (reconnaissance and sabotage) groups in temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, including patriotic civilians who have combat experience…
At the same time it’s necessary to pay attention to creating reliable covert legends for operational and fighting (reconnaissance and sabotage) actions (disguised as fighting between criminal groups and local groups for influence, activity of guerrilla and separatist movements, operations of the Russian intelligence agencies and so on)”.
It turns out that Kiev began rapid preparation of forces that were literally terrorist groups that included the locals who were dissatisfied with DPR-LPR authorities. And the consequences of sabotage and terrorist attacks will be attributed to local criminals fighting for influence, or unknown liberation movement, or Russian intelligence agencies.
Remember how many times after assassination attempts on the military-political leadership of the DPR-LPR and the militia commanders the versions about criminal disassembly or special operations of the FSB-GRU-SVR of Russia to eliminate undesirable were immediately launched? In fact, the SBU and its recruited agents were behind the organization of terrorist attacks and sabotage. Let me remind you that only the head of the DPR, Alexander Zacharchenko, was the target of assassination attempts on August 14, 2014, January 30, 2015, may 8, 2017, and on August 31, 2018 the terrorists achieved their goal by killing the leader of the Donetsk Republic.
The death of another eminent military person of DPR - the commander of the “Sparta” battalion Arsen Pavlov (nom de geurre “Motorola”) who has been blown up in his house on October 16, 2016 became one of the most wide-known acts of terrorism. On February 8, 2017 the terrorists have killed the commander of the “Somali” battalion Mikhail Tolstykh (nom de guerre “Givi”). All these cases were supported by a storm of fake reports from the Ukrainian media
There are a lot of such facts of sabotage, InfoPsyOps, and terrorism of Ukraine’s special services.
FOREIGN INSTRUCTORS IN UKRAINE
By the way, point 5 of Decision of Joint Intelligence Committee that we mentioned above deserves closer attention.
Decision of the Joint Intelligence Committee under the President of Ukraine as of April 21, 2015 (Page 3)
“Security service of Ukraine together with intelligence bodies of Ukraine in cooperation with foreign partner structures in two week period has to begin the preparation of operational and fighting (reconnaissance and sabotage) groups using the infrastructure existing in Ukraine with involvement of foreign specialists”.
After this Decision numerous specialists from the USA, Great Britain, Poland, and Baltic states appeared in Ukraine to train the members of Department of Counterintelligence of SBU, Main Intelligence Directorate of Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and Armed Forces units to conduct acts of terrorism and murders, and also teach you to shift the blame for your actions to others. So, the blood of the people of Donbass is on hands of these foreign “specialists” also.
In 2016 several hundreds of the servicemen from Great Britain came to train Ukrainian military. Among them were:
During 2016-2017 the same mission was performed by yet another couple of hundreds specialists but this time from USA. Here are a few names and IDs:
Besides, two groups of information operations specialists of the 77th Brigade of British Royal Armed Forces operated in JOF zone. They included about 10 servicemen, they were located in “Chayka” and “Reikartz” hotels in Mariupol city and in “Sapfir” hotel of Kramatorsk city acting under cover. Some of them pretended to be OSCE members, others have arrived to the scene like journalists. SBU was responsible for their security.
The British specialists were engaged in interception of mobile phone calls, conducted operations of information influence, carried out fake news campaigns on media, and trained Ukrainian specialists.
Western “consultants”, specialists from Great Britain in particular, participated in one of the most tragic provocations of the Ukrainian intelligence agencies in Donbass. You can find more details in my investigation film about a catastrophe of Malaysian “Boeing 777” over Donbass in July, 2014. At that moment two representatives of the British intelligence agencies have been operating in the zone of conflict and controlled the preparation of the operation.
SABOTAGE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN EASTERN UKRAINE
Sabotage and psychological operations against Sloviansk
But let me give you another example illustrating paragraph two of the above-mentioned Decision. This operation was planned by the SBU during unsuccessful attempts to take the city of Slavyansk.
SBU Plan for Sloviansk operation (Page 1)
SBU Plan for Sloviansk operation (Page 2)
Specialists of the SBU of Ukraine planned a special operation, the purpose of which was to spread among the population of Sloviansk information that the people's mayor of the city Ponomarev has a serious conflict with criminal circles from Russia. The target audience in this case was the population of Slavyansk and the militia soldiers who defended the city.
According to the plan, SBU intended to carry out a “gang up” on the owner of the plant of high-voltage insulators Rybachuk under the guise of a Russian (Chechen) criminal group. The organizers of this action were confident that Rybachuk would seek assistance from Ponomarev, who, accordingly, would not make any concessions in favor of “criminal organization”. This was to be followed by arson of Rybachuk's cars and threats to Ponomarev himself. It was planned to spread information about Ponomarev's conflict with the Russian criminal group through the agent network of the SBU employee Sergey Motorin (who, by the way, became infamous later, when he joined the 5th Directorate of the SBU and directly participated in the liquidation of Arsen Pavlov's “Motorola”).
Well and an ultimate goal of the whole operation was, I quote: “Further possible elimination of Ponomarev and his allies will be apprehended by the population of Sloviansk as a revenge of the Russian organized criminal group”.
No comment. Explicit adherence to paragraph 2 of the Decision.
The same document contains much more interesting info. For example, how the SBU employees were going to put down power lines and transformer stations to completely deprive the residents of Sloviansk of power. A specially trained tactical groups, including employees and fighters of the Center of special operations “A” (“Alpha”) have been prepared to conduct this operation. Moreover, they also planned to destabilize the work of mobile maintenance groups who would’ve arrived to the scenes to repair the objects.
Why would SBU need to deprive city of power? As specified in the document, “to counter Russian TV and radio broadcasting”. Such Ukraine-style freedom of speech.
It is a striking example of the attitude of the Ukrainian military and security forces to civilians. Sloviansk city and Crimean Peninsula could’ve faced serious negative effects, but this is never considered by Kiev!
Propaganda campaign in ArtemovskSometimes the Security Service was also entrusted with rather primitive routine propaganda tasks. Both in the DPR and LPR, and on the Ukraine controlled territory. For example, it was required to put up propaganda posters on the streets of some cities.
This is a report on the activities of the task force of JS CD SBU deployed in Artemovsk, that was later renamed to Bahmut. Paragraph 3 of the document refers to the conduct of pro-Ukrainian propaganda in Artemovsk. Beeing supported by pro-Kiev S.Nikolaenko, the CEO of the “Bahmut Ukrainian” public organization, and V.Stamenov, the CEO of “Bahmut Fortress”, the Security Service team placed posters containing mottoes “Ukraine – above all!”, “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to Heroes!” and “Ukraine – a united country!” upon the roads of the city.
Of course, such propaganda activity is more an exception than a rule that is being a routine task of the Security Service. In its activities, this intelligence agency most often uses very sophisticated forms and methods of influencing target audiences.
Sabotage and psychological operations against the LPR
As a due example, I offer a document prepared by SBU officers in the city of Severodonetsk, who were engaged in SPO against the LPR. The document is large in size, so I have translated just a part of it regarding two operations against the LPR. The first one is operation “Drain”, which deals with the creation of fake legislative acts of the LPR state bodies and their dissemination for the sake of... “misinformation, aimed at discrediting terrorist leaders, certain aspects of their activities, initiating panic and increasing centrifugal trends in the ranks of fighters within the framework of other operational activities. In addition, some “drains” can encourage terrorists to search for traitors in their ranks and repression in administrative apparatus (this requires single plums of real separatist documents)“.
Information operation “Drain”
In another Operation, named “Forum-Storm”, it was planned to create “a group of professional trolls and bots on different forums and websites of the LPR/DPR, who would comment in a certain manner, distribute certain news materials, misinformation and the like within the framework of a planned goal (discredit, panic, spread of compromise, hearing, etc.)”.
So I would strongly recommend to be careful about comments on social media, forums and under media articles. They are mostly written by such “daughters of officers” (a Crimean sort of Syrian Bana girl).
SBU’s information and psychological operations
In addition, SBU conducted a number of long-running operations.
Special information operations SBU report (Page 1)
Special information operations SBU report (Page 2)
The majority of these operations are aimed at creating of a negative image of Russia (“Russia – is an aggressor”), and political leaders of the DPR/LPR as well (“Spiders in a jar”, “Mobilize “gilded youth” of the DPR and LPR”, “National lustration”, etc.). In addition, within the “Chronicle of Occupation” operation, SBU specialists try their best to convince the population of Donbass that the critical situation has developed with the arrival of the “Russian world”.
Propaganda on a commercial radio
For SPO sake, Ukrainian security institutions actively use not only social networks, but traditional media as well, including publications, radio and television. At the same time, they fell absolutely free to take air time and frequencies away from commercial bodies, motivating this by the need to resist “the Russian aggression”.
A letter from the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council
“They are waiting for you at home” campaign
As noted above, the SBU launched a campaign aimed specifically at the Donbass militia called “They are waiting for you at home” (Ukrainian: «На тебе чекають вдома»).
The idea of this campaign and its development belongs in general to the employees of the National Academy of the Security Service and personally to its rector – Colonel Sergei Kudinov. According to the official website of the campaign, it has been active since 2015, and by 2019 more than 360 people took advantage of it. The SBU actively promotes the mentioned campaign, promising everyone who is willing to get pardoned. Except SBU did not indicat, that the campaign has no legal effect, and no one guarantees its participant legal amnesty.
A letter from SBU regarding “They wait you at home” campaign
Those who believe the SBU get into very unpleasant situations: they are still being convicted in Ukraine or being engaged as a witness in criminal cases against other supporters of the DPR/LPR.
Sometimes the fate of credulous men turns out to be quite tragic. As, for example, in the case of militiaman Andrey Gordeev, who on July 14, 2018 moved to the Ukraine controlled territory to take advantage of the campaign. Four days later, his body, with traces of torture and gunshot wounds, was dumped at the DPR positions.
And to this day the SBU is spreading propaganda bait for those who, experiencing a natural longing for home, will stick on it and get into the networks of special services for further exploitation and use in the interests of official Kiev authorities .
The second most important structure, which carries out sabotage and psychological operations against the DPR/LPR we previously mentioned is the Special Operations Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The SOF was established in 2016 as a new branch of the army, comprising also Ukraine’s InfoPsyOps units:
These centers report to the InfoPsyOps Department within the SOF Command. A joint unit and task force of the mentioned centers take part in the JFO. Personnel is rotated after a certain period of time
SOF Command Telephone Directory (Page 1)
SOF Command Telephone Directory (Page 2)
In due time I coped to make quite close ties with the SOF supremes. In particular, with Igor Lunev, the SOF Commanding General, and his first deputy Colonel Sergey Krivonos.
As a result, I felt at home in the SOF Command Post, including the Directorate of InfoPsyOps, I was acquainted with almost all of the officers there.
Krivonos S.G. (right)
For example, I took the following photos in one of the InfoPsyOps offices.
In the office of the Department of InfoPsyOps, SOF Command
The map on the wall is entitled “A map of territories temporarily occupied by Moscow.” In particular, Sakhalin and other Far Eastern regions of Russia are highlighted in red. Funny pictures are being hung on the walls by the officers, aren't they? I wonder if this can be qualified as inciting separatism, which is so condemned by all Ukrainian patriots?
There is a list of SOF structures including the above-mentioned InfoPsyOps Centers next to the map.
InfoPsyOps Centers operations
At the end of 2019, information on current psychological activities in which InfoPsyOps Centers could participate was published on the Internet. The event, codenamed “Clivage,” involved dissemination of misinformation about increased level of radiation in Enakievo. During the “Health” campaign, propagandists wanted to intimidate the residents of DPR/LPR with an epidemic of tuberculosis. Miners in turn were supposed to become targets to the action with the cipher “Shakhtar.”
Besides, officers of the Senior (72nd) InfoPsyOps Center maintained fake news sites of informnapalm.org, seabreeze.org.ua, podvodka.info, infoaccent.net. The “Calendar of military glory of the Ukraine Armed Forces,” “Music of Ukrainian warriors,” “Radio operations of Joint Forces,” “Cyber-Maidan,” “Guide to information security” and others were also on the list of their developments.
Some publications and campaigns were ordered by military propagandists from the third-party contractors. Information about this is often published on public procurement sites or posted by bloggers. On average, the InfoPsyOps Centers spend about $380 000 on such outsourcing annually.
For example, 83rd Center has recently ordered a series of videos discrediting the “Russian world” in Crimea. This document made it clear to me that the Ukrainians do not understand and have never understood Crimean inhabitants, their former co-citizens. They are trying to intimidate them with a downturn in tourism that has only grown since 2014. Meanwhile greedy and low-budget Ukrainian tourists did not greatly contribute to the regional development before. Moreover, Crimean people know perfectly who they should thank for the years of lack of water and electricity – former fellow citizens.
Judging by another propaganda video development request, this time to discredit the Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the tasks of InfoPsyOps are being also set for the 73rd Naval Center of special operations (field number A-1594), which is located in Ochakov.
Propaganda video development request
InfoPsyOps units troubles within SOF Command
Speaking to many officers of the SOF Command and the InfoPsyOps Department, as well as with the InfoPsyOps regional Centers employees, with whom the author attended NATO PSYOPS courses, I drew attention to some contradiction, more precisely – to the organizational and methodological inconsistency of the two types of activities. I'll try to explain what I mean.
The fact is that the leadership of the SOF was composed mainly of people representing Special Forces (Spetsnaz) and Airborne troops. It was difficult for them to deeply understand the tasks and purpose of InfoPsyOps units. In their understanding, the SOF is, first of all, responsible for sabotage, special intelligence and terrorist attacks on the enemy territory. Their professionalism has nothing in common with the “military nerds” – officers with civilian duties, smart conversations, tablets and laptops. In this regard, the SOF Command initially had and still has a somewhat alienated and cool attitude towards the activities of the InfoPsyOps units.
There is a bright memory from the past: in 2017 I once again visited the SOF Command building and waited for General Lunev to meet me. There were two Special Forces Colonels in the reception room with me. These officers discussed quite loudly the arrival of a cargo ship from the United States in Odessa port with 20 Humvees for the needs of the SOF. During the discussion, one of the Colonels noted that most of the vehicles would leave for Special Forces units under the Command, while a few had been requested by InfoPsyOps Centers. The reaction of the second Colonel was violent – “They will get nothing! And why would they need Humvees? They bought laptops, that is more enough!” This pretty vividly characterizes the attitude towards InfoPsyOps specialists within the SOF Command.
Corruption, the major problem of modern Ukraine, has also been relevant in the SOF. Financial abuses of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Sergienko, the CO of the 74th InfoPsyOps Center have long been carried out by law enforcement agencies.
State secrets protection has also been a mission impossible. The personal data of the 72nd and 83rd InfoPsyOps Centers personnel, as well as their Internet assets has leaked to the Web and become publicly available. In accordance with Ukrainian legislation, information regarding the armed forces personnel is a State secret. That is why the question “Who is to blame of the state secrets disclosure if the source of the leak is the officers of 72nd InfoPsyOps Center themselves?” was sarcastically spreading through social networks.
There is to be an answer to this question. Following the leak of the restricted information about the 83rd InfoPsyOps Centre to the Internet, the Control bodies of the Ukrainian armed forces confirmed the authenticity of the documents posted and commenced an investigation to determine the causes of the leak. The SOF Command, in their turn, performed an official investigation as well.
After the investigation had been over, Colonel V.V.Lavrus, the 83rd InfoPsyOps Centre CO, Major S.V.Kovalenok, the Deputy Commander for Logistics, and Lieutenant S.A.Soloviev, the Head of the State Secret Protection Service were found guilty.
The above-mentioned facts show serious problems in the SOF InfoPsyOps units. It is a misunderstanding by the Command of the specifics and their activities, corruption, state secrets disclosure, illiterate personnel, etc. Such “diseases” of the InfoPsyOps structures affect the effectiveness of their activities a lot, and question any possibility of a productive reset.
As I previously mentioned in my other investigation of the Ukrainian influence operations in Europe, it is possible that these systemic problems may have led to the decision to transferthe InfoPsyOps Centers to the newly created Communications and Cybersecurity Command.
Confrontation between special services
The problem of coordination and interaction between the power structures is the weakest point in the planning and implementation of SPO. This, by the way, is being recognized by the leadership of the security forces themselves. As an example, I offer a document to confirm this insight.
DCIS' report on special information operations (Page 1)
DCIS' report on special information operations (Page 2)
According to the document, Colonel O.Dovidkov, the then SBU Deputy Head of the DCIS, reports that his office is actively working on special information operations including at the state level. It’s pointed out that these operations are carried out in close cooperation with the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Directorate of Intelligence of Ukrainian MoD and the Administration of State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. The NSDC coordinates this activity.
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the document doesn’t mention the involvement of the SOF InfoPsyOps units in the operation and, as a consequence, coordination of joint actions with them.
Someone can say: well…forgot to include InfoPsyOps units…anything could happen…made a mistake. However, in my opinion, this is not an accident but a dominant trend: SBU doesn’t believe in the effectiveness of information efforts made by the Armed Forces. By the way, the former Deputy Minister of Information Policy of Ukraine Tatiana Popova recognizes this departmental selfishness and other mistakes. In March 2017, she said: “Today, more professionals and decision makers understand the inefficiency of some methods and projects of information war that are being currently implemented. And some “projects” are already led by law enforcement agencies. Therefore, we should expect a certain reset of this direction sooner or later”.
The lack of coordination led to the fact that the officers of one of the special services eliminated agents of another agency on the territory of unrecognized republics. I won’t mention names, but certain people will understand what I’m saying about. As a result, this led to scandal but nothing changed. Nobody wanted to concede this confrontation and the interests of the state took a back seat.In the behind-the-scenes struggle between Ukrainian special services on the field of the information war, it seems to me that the upper hand is still prevailed by the Security Service. Main concepts are born in this structure. The rest are involved in terms of concerning or are not involved at all.
As to me, it is not a coincidence that President Vladimir Zelensky on March 26 awarded the rank of Major General to the Deputy Head of the DCIS Julia Laputina, who became the second female general in Ukraine.
I think that it is a recognition not only of her personal merits but also the service’s “achievements”. President notes that Laputina “knows what the protection of the country from Russian aggression is”. Having made her a General, the management of the SBU will use this model as a motivator of professional formation of the information front’s fighter and imitation model for the young generation. Here’re just a few strokes to her portrait.
She's 51 and has been serving in the SBU since 1992. By the way, her husband also serves there. She was professionally engaged in sports shooting, presented PhD thesis in psychology. She worked in counterintelligence and then as a senior officer at the Special Operations Center “A”. She participated in operations to neutralize the “separatist putsch” in Crimea in 1994. In 2008 she developed the Concept of Mental Integration of Crimean Citizens into Ukraine. After the announcement of the anti-terrorist operation in April 2014, she provided the landing of the first combined group of SBU in Kramatorsk Airport.
INFORMATION WARFARE UNITS
Probably, InfoPsyOps became a trendy topic in the ranks of Ukrainian security forces. Not so long ago the Information Warfare (IW) units were created in Ukrainian Armed Forces in order to detect and counter information threats. At the level of the ground forces headquarters, an IW department was formed and consisted of 3-4 officers. Monitoring and counteraction teams which consisted of 5 military and civilian specialists were formed in brigades and regional military committees.
In addition to weekly reports on the publication of negative materials about Ukrainian armed forces on the Internet, these units also spread positive articles about military service and maintain official pages of military brigades on Facebook. For example, 14 separate mechanized brigade is available at facebook.com/14ombr, and 57 motorized brigade is facebook.com/57InfantryBrigade, etc.
In the General Staff of Ukrainian Armed Forces, Major General Rapko, Head of the General Directorate of Communications and Information Systems – Head of Communications Troops, was appointed responsible for this work. Major General Bargilevich, Deputy Commander for Territorial Defense, oversees the information struggle in the Ground Forces. Lieutenant Colonel Kostenko was appointed Head of the Ground Forces Headquarters’ Department of Operations.
Training of specialists is carried out at the Military Institute of Telecommunication and Informational support named after Heroes Krut. In particular, they are trained to work on the automated monitoring complex "Oko" and the special program on distribution of information materials "Bliskavka" ("Lightning").
Work on social networks is organized from fake accounts. In this way, officers periodically have problems with Facebook, which actively blocks such "figures".
It is clear that the structure is still in the formation stage, so it is not surprising that the work is carried out quite formally.
The creation of new units of information war in the ranks of Ukrainian Armed Forces may indicate the growing mistrust of the Ukrainian military command towards the leadership of the SOF. Increasingly, the Special Operations Forces chiefs position themselves as independent players not only in the power bloc but also in the political space of Ukraine.
Finally, I want to note a slight correction in InfoPsyOps vector toward Donbass. The most aggressive SPO actions occurred during the period of President P.Poroshenko, i.e. from 2014 to 2019. It was during this period many terrorist attacks were carried out, aggressive propaganda materials were distributed, and considerable efforts and funds were allocated for these purposes.
However, as further developments have shown, the highly influential “war party” in Ukraine and radical nationalists oppose such an adjustment of information policy towards the Donbass republics and insist on a forceful solution of this conflict. And representatives of this “party” are winning. A clear example of this is the resignation of S.Sivohi after his attempts to establish a dialogue with the DPR/LPR. Resignation followed after the pressure by nationalist circles.
And here again it is worth mentioning the activity of SOF InfoPsyOps units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The first critics of the new president’s attempts to start a settlement of the conflict in Donbass were the media platforms controlled by the SOF InfoPsyOps units. And first of all, the infamous “InformNapalm”, “Sprotiv”, “Enigma”, which are actively used by the employees of InfoPsyOps units to carry out their operations. These platforms were the ones who began to actively spread the allegedly “disrespectful” tone of Zelensky in conversation with the fighter of Ukrainian Armed Forces during his visit to JOF zone. They also started and constantly maintained a negative focus on Zelensky’s phrase “You just have to stop shooting...” And here it is worth noting that all attempts made by new administration to settle the conflict in Donbass region suspiciously coincided with the intensification of hostilities. Every method was accepted. The bombing of Marines during works on engineering equipment of positions near Pavlopoly in August 2019, which the Ukrainian side immediately wrote off for attack from a grenade launcher from the DPR side. Four miles from the front line! And the death of two snipers, senior officers of the Central Security Service “A” at the end of November 2019, on the DPR controlled territory. And once again the Ukrainian side quickly accused Donetsk and Russia. In both cases, it was a strong hit at peace supporters in Donbass.
So, here’s my conclusion. There’s a very strong pro-military lobby in security structures of Ukraine, which came to the leadership positions when Poroshenko was in office. This lobby doesn’t need peace in the region. Naturally, the new president’s populist attempts have aroused ardent resistance from the representatives of this lobby. Therefore, the provoking of hostilities and InfoPsyOps units’ information attacks against the Ukrainian leader went into action. Who are the members of this lobby?
Just remember Zelensky’s inauguration. The only chiefs in the power bloc who did not give him the honor were the Chairman of the SBU Gritzak and SOF Commander Lunev. And if it became possible to remove Gritzak from the office (although there are still a lot of his supporters left there), Lunev, on the contrary, holds his post firmly. No scandals, including corruption by his son or data leakage from InfoPsyOps units, can remove him from the post.
This means that Ukrainian security forces will continue their little effective, but certainly criminal, sabotage and psychological operations.https://yadi.sk/i/0TlJrI2TOnuh6A